

Opacity Problems in Multi-Energy Timed Automata

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- The observation of some elements related to the functioning of a system can be enough to extract sensitive data

Motivations

- The observation of some elements related to the functioning of a system can be enough to extract sensitive data
- Pentagon Pizza theory: a spike in pizza orders from the pentagon foreshadow a major crisis



Context: Timing attacks over programs

```
1  # input pwd      : Real password
2  # input attempt: Tentative password
3  for i = 0 to min(len(pwd), len(attempt)) - 1 do
4      # comparison check takes 1 time unit
5      if pwd[i] /= attempt[i] then
6          return false
7  done
8  return true
9
```

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pwd	p	a	t	e	H	e	n	a	f	f
attempt	p	a	s	t	a					

Execution time:

Context: Timing attacks over programs

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Execution time: 1

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Execution time: $1 + 1$

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Execution time: $1 + 1 + 1 = 3$

- **Problem:** The execution time is proportional to the number of consecutive correct characters from the beginning of **attempt**


- Opacity captures the attacker's ability to infer secret information based on publicly observable behaviours
- Problems of opacity studied by Franz Cassez on Timed Automata¹
 - Observation: set of actions together with their timestamp
- Alternative definition given by Étienne André²³
 - Observation: execution time

¹The dark side of Timed Opacity, 2009

²The Bright Side of Timed Opacity, 2024

³Configuring Timing Parameters to Ensure Execution-Time Opacity in Timed Automata, 2024.

Timed automata



- Set of clocks
- Clocks can be reset
- Guards and invariants

Energy based attacks over programs

```
1  # input pwd      : Real password
2  # input attempt: Tentative password
3  for i = 0 to min(len(pwd), len(attempt)) - 1 do
4      # comparison check consumes 1 energy unit
5      if pwd[i] /= attempt[i] then
6          wait(len(attempt) - 1 - i)
7          return false
8  done
9  return true
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```

Execution time = relative to the attempt size

Energy based attacks over programs


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
Energy consumed: $1 + 1 + 1 = 3 \rightarrow$ proportional to the prefix match length

- Goal: study of opacity problems with adding observation of energy or cost constraints:
 - Introducing a more generalized model: guarded Multi-Energy Timed Automata (guarded-META)
 - Defining new opacity problems taking into account the consumption and accumulation of ressources
 - The attacker has access to the model and final valuation of energy variables




- Energy variables: temperature t , battery b
 - Energy variables cannot drop below 0
- Continuous evolution in locations
 - In charging location, the battery and the temperature continuously increase at different rates.
- Discrete evolution in transitions
 - Flashing decreases the battery and increases the temperature instantaneously
- Guards and Invariants on energy variables

Guarded-META




State of a run: (ℓ, w, v) where


- ℓ : current location
- w : values of each clock variable
- v : values of each energy variable




$$\rho = (\text{standby}, 0, [0, 0])$$




$$\rho = (\text{standby}, 0, [0, 0]) \xrightarrow{(0, \text{charge})} (\text{charging}, 0, [0, 0])$$




$$\rho = (\text{standby}, 0, [0, 0]) \xrightarrow{(0, \text{charge})} (\text{charging}, 0, [0, 0]) \xrightarrow{(10, \text{cool})} (\text{cooling}, 10, [10, 20])$$




$$\begin{aligned}
 \rho &= (\text{standby}, 0, [0, \vec{0}]) \xrightarrow{(0, \text{charge})} (\text{charging}, 0, [0, \vec{0}]) \xrightarrow{(10, \text{cool})} \\
 &(\text{cooling}, 10, [10, \vec{20}]) \xrightarrow{(5, \text{fly})} (\text{flying}, 15, [5, \vec{20}])
 \end{aligned}$$



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 &(\text{flying}, 0, [14, \vec{11}]) \xrightarrow{(0, \text{land})} (\text{mission success}, 0, [14, \vec{11}]).
 \end{aligned}$$

private and public runs of a guarded-META

- A run ρ is *private* if it visited the private location
- A run ρ is *public* if it didn't visit the private location

private and public runs of a guarded-META

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-
- $EVisit^{priv}(\mathcal{A})$: set of all the final energy values of the private runs of $\mathcal{A}$
 - $EVisit^{pub}(\mathcal{A})$: set of all the final energy values of the public runs of $\mathcal{A}$

private and public runs of a guarded-META

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- $EVisit^{priv}(\mathcal{A})$: set of all the final energy values of the private runs of $\mathcal{A}$
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-
- A guarded META $\mathcal{A}$ is **fully-opaque w.r.t. energy** (*or fully-EN-opaque*) when $EVisit^{priv}(\mathcal{A}) = EVisit^{pub}(\mathcal{A})$.
 - In other terms: for every final energy values of a run, it is indistinguishable whether the private location is visited.

Opacity problem


We define the following decision problem:

Full-EN-opacity problem:

INPUT: A guarded META $\mathcal{A}$


PROBLEM: Is $\mathcal{A}$ fully-EN-opaque?

Example



- Full-EN-Opacity ?

Example



- Full-EN-Opacity ? ✗

$$\begin{aligned}
 \rho_{pub} &= (\text{standby}, 0, [0, \vec{0}]) \xrightarrow{(0, \text{charge})} (\text{charging}, 0, [0, \vec{0}]) \xrightarrow{(0.5, \text{cool})} \\
 &(\text{cooling}, 0.5, [0.5, 1]) \xrightarrow{(0.5, \text{fly})} (\text{flying}, 1, [0, \vec{1}]) \xrightarrow{(0, \text{land})} (\text{mission success}, 1, [0, \vec{1}])
 \end{aligned}$$

- If a run is private, then the final value of temperature is higher than 5.

Theorem

*full-EN-opacity for discrete guarded METAs^a with 2 energy variables and 1 clock is **undecidable**.*

^adiscrete guarded-META: guarded-META with only discrete evolution of energy

Proof.

Reduction from the halting problem for a two-counter machine, which is undecidable (see paper). □

→ restrict ourselves to a single energy or to only positive rate energy

Decidability for positive discrete META


Theorem

*Full-EN-opacity is **decidable** in 2-EXPSpace for positive discrete META^a.*

^apositive discrete guarded-META: discrete guarded-META where the energy variable can only increase

Proof idea

Given a positive discrete META




^aR. Alur and D. L. Dill., A theory of timed automata, 1994

^bKopczynski, Eryk, Parikh Images of Grammars:
Complexity and Applications, 2010

Proof idea

Given a positive discrete META

- 1 Construct of two non-deterministic finite automata:
 - Remove updates “ $+N$ ”




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Proof idea

Given a positive discrete META

- 1 Construct of two non-deterministic finite automata:
 - Remove updates “ $+N$ ”
 - Add increment symbols inc_i (denote an increment of energy i)




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Proof idea

Given a positive discrete META

- 1 Construct of two non-deterministic finite automata:
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 - Add increment symbols inc_i (denote an increment of energy i)
 - Construct the untimed language of private runs (using region graph^a)
 - Construct the untimed language of public runs




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Proof idea

Given a positive discrete META

- ① Construct of two non-deterministic finite automata:
 - Remove updates “ $+N$ ”
 - Add increment symbols inc_i (denote an increment of energy i)
 - Construct the untimed language of private runs (using region graph^a)
 - Construct the untimed language of public runs
- ② Compare the number occurrences of each symbols inc_i using Parikh's image^b



$$EVisit^{pub}(\mathcal{A}) = \text{Parikh}(\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{RA}(\mathcal{A}_{pub}))) \\ = \{(2, 1)\}$$

$$EVisit^{priv}(\mathcal{A}) = \text{Parikh}(\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{RA}(\mathcal{A}_{priv}))) \\ = \{(n, 1), n \in \mathbb{N}\}$$

$$\text{Parikh}(\mathcal{L}) = \{(|\omega|_{inc_1}, |\omega|_{inc_2}, \dots, |\omega|_{inc_n}), \omega \in \mathcal{L}\}$$

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^bKopczynski, Eryk, Parikh Images of Grammars: Complexity and Applications, 2010

Proof idea


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$$Parikh(\mathcal{L}) = \{(|\omega|_{inc_1}, |\omega|_{inc_2}, \dots, |\omega|_{inc_n}), \omega \in \mathcal{L}\}$$

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$$EVisit^{pub}(\mathcal{A}) = Parikh(\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{RA}(\mathcal{A}_{pub}))) = \{(2, 1)\}$$

$$EVisit^{priv}(\mathcal{A}) = Parikh(\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{RA}(\mathcal{A}_{priv}))) = \{(n, 1), n \in \mathbb{N}\}$$

$$EVisit^{pub}(\mathcal{A}) \neq EVisit^{priv}(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow \text{Not fully EN-Opaque}$$

Decidability for discrete ETA

Theorem

*Full-EN-opacity is **decidable** in 2-EXPSpace for discrete ETAs^a.*

^adiscrete ETA: discrete guarded-META with one energy and not energy constraint

Proof idea.

- 1 adding symbols *inc* et *dec* to denote energy increments and decrements,
- 2 construction of the untimed language of private runs and public runs
- 3 transformation into unary pushdown automata to simulate a one-counter machine (push for increment, pop for decrement)
- 4 Language inclusion of unary PDA is decidable^a



^aChistikov and Majumdar, Unary Pushdown Automata and Straight-Line Programs, 2014

Other problems studied (see paper)

- $\exists$ **EN-Opacity**
 - Check if at least one final energy valuation is shared between a public run and a private run
- **Weak EN-Opacity**
 - It is OK to deduce that the secret location was NOT visited
- **ET-EN-opacity**
 - Observing the final energy valuation and duration of runs
- **DE-opacity** (Discrete-Energy opacity)
 - Observing the energy valuation every time unit
- **bDE-opacity** (buffered-DE opacity)
 - Observing the buffered energy changes every time unit

Conclusion

Contributions:

- Introduction of a new model with time and energy
- Definition of new opacity notions
- Decidability results

Future works:

- Study missing results
- Energy Parametrisation
- Expiring Opacity⁴
 - The secret can be revealed after some time has passed
- implementation in IMITATOR software

⁴André et Al., Configuring Timing Parameters to Ensure Execution-Time Opacity in Timed Automata, 2024

Our results in a nutshell


For each $\gamma \in \{\exists, \text{weak}, \text{full}\}$	γ -EN-opacity	γ -ET-EN-opacity
Discrete positive METAs	2EXPSpace	2EXPSpace
Discrete positive guarded METAs	3EXPSpace	3EXPSpace
Discrete (guarded) ETAs	decidable	
Discrete guarded METAs	undecidable	

Table 1: Decidability of (ET-)EN-opacity in discrete METAs

	DE-opacity		bDE-opacity	
	$\exists$	Weak / full	$\exists$	Weak / full
Discrete positive (guarded) ETAs	EXPSpace		2EXPSpace*	
Discrete positive (guarded) METAs	decidable		2EXPSpace*	
Discrete ETAs			2EXPSpace	
Discrete METAs				
Discrete guarded METAs	undecidable			

Table 2: Decidability of (b)DE-opacity in discrete METAs

Construction of the PDA



◀ Return